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Introduction
The ongoing global financial crisis is underlining the
relevance of restructuring bank balance sheets.
Questions regarding the methods available for as-
sisting banks and other financial institutions are more
pertinent now than ever before.Many of the methods
described in this paper have recently been the subject
of an economic policy debate in the Czech Republic
and around the world.1 Providing banks in difficulty
with assistance that does not directly penalise share-
holders and managers for crisis situations has proven
to be risky and associated with high moral hazard.
Where liquidating a bank and paying out insured de-
posits seems systemically risky – despite being the
cleanest method from the market perspective – and
where public money has to be used, the state should
gain a majority stake in the problem bank.This gives
it control over the bank and minimises the influence
of existing shareholders and managers over the run-
ning of the bank, whose managers, with the share-
holders’ agreement, got the bank into difficulties to
start with. The goal of this paper is to provide the
reader with an overview of the Czech experience with
problem bank assets, together with the theoretical
background for asset management companies.
Theoretical approaches to working out problem as-
sets in bank balance sheets 
From the general accounting perspective, problem
bank assets2 can be worked out using two basic ap-
proaches – via the asset side and/or via the liability
side of the bank’s balance sheet. In the first case, the
bank’s problem assets are bought up by a state or oth-
er institution and replaced with other assets – usual-
ly securities issued specially for this purpose by the
state. These changes primarily affect the bank’s bal-
ance sheet on the asset side only. In the case of a lia-
bility side workout,the state provides financial assets
to banks in various ways; either it finances the losses
directly or it takes an ownership interest in them.This
gives rise to changes in equity capital and, of course,
changes on the asset side as well. These are just the
basic approaches and can naturally occur in modified
form. In this paper, we are going to deal purely with
the first approach to problem bank assets, i.e., asset
side restructuring.3
Asset management agencies4
One of the techniques for managing problem bank
assets is to establish an asset management company
(AMC) and then to transfer the assets to it.The ob-
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Woo (2000), Klingebiel (2000) or White (2004).jective of this technique is to accelerate the debt re-
structuring process.To ensure maximum transparen-
cy of this process,the life of a public AMC should be
time-limited5 and announced to market participants
in advance,preferably when it is established.Figure 1
illustrates how public (state) AMCs function.
The main incentive for establishing an AMC is the
existence of a large quantity of non-performing loans
(NPLs) and the fact that banks themselves do not
necessarily have experience in recovering NPLs.The
advantages of AMCs include: (i) economies of scale
(the problem loans of several banks or of the entire
banking sector are worked out by just one institu-
tion, which can bundle problem assets and sell them
en bloc)6; (ii) special powers granted by the govern-
ment to expedite debt recovery even in an environ-
ment of weak market discipline and underdeveloped
legislation; (iii) the breaking of “crony” connections
between banks and businesses; (iv) the creation of a
secondary market in problem (non-performing) as-
sets,7 as such assets cannot be sold on the secondary
market unless such a market exists;(v) better returns
on capital invested in banks.The technique also has
its drawbacks: (i) a risk of a lack of sufficient skills,
information and experience among the managers in-
stalled in the AMC by the government; (ii) the gen-
eration of complex legal disputes linked with the ad-
ministrative demands of this technique;(iii) politici-
sation of the AMC’s work; (iv) possible corruption
pressures;and above all (v) the risk of moral hazard
for banks that are relieved of NPLs.
All these factors combined make it difficult to esti-
mate ex ante the net benefits of this technique. A
World Bank study8 corrects the popular view that
AMCs, unlike other market ap-
proaches to working out banking
sector problems, avoid the disad-
vantages stemming from underde-
veloped legal and institutional en-
vironments. This  popular  view is
mistaken because of the afore-
mentioned limiting effect of weak
institutional environments on the
ability of AMCs to achieve their
objectives. AMC managers can be subject to corrup-
tion and political (if the ruling party changes) and
other pressure to favour sub-optimal solutions. The
politicisation of the whole debt restructuring process
is greater the higher the ratio of claims transferred to
the AMC is to the total debt in the economy.
Transferring non-performing loans to an AMC does
not make them disappear from the economy and does
not enable the economy to avoid debt restructuring.
As a matter of principle,it would also be wrong to re-
lieve banks (through a centralised AMC) of all their
bad debts.To maintain the best possible conditions of
market competition, state interventions should be as
small as possible. Hence, only the most cumbersome
loans should be transferred; less problematic ones
should be restructured by the banks at their own ex-
pense. The rule of thumb in this area should be to
achieve in the final stage an equal proportion of non-
performing assets in all banks, i.e., in those which
have received assistance and also in those which have
sorted themselves out.This will to some extent limit
discrimination against banks whose asset portfolios
have not developed into such a bad state and whose
NPLs have therefore not been purchased by a cen-
tralised AMC.
Macroeconomic context of the formation of
Consolidation Bank
In the context of the post-1989 transformation of the
Czech economy,changes to the banking system were
planned and implemented in the early 1990s. These
changes related primarily to the banking legislation
and the ensuing institutional interbank relationship
setup and involved a switch from a one-tier to a two-
tier banking system (with central and commercial
banking functionally separated).Given the restrictive
monetary and fiscal policy in place at the time, the
Czech Republic had a low-inflation economic envi-
ronment compared to other post-communist coun-
tries. This low-inflation environment did not erode







5Which was,by law,the case in the Czech Republic,see the section
on the CCA below.
6 Large bundles of assets can attract large potential buyers, which
may ultimately expedite the securitisation of those assets.
7 In the Czech case, the establishment of an AMC (the Czech
Consolidation Bank/Agency) aided the creation of a secondary mar-
ket in (problem) unpaid debts.
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the value of existing assets and therefore prevented
a solution whereby higher inflation would reduce the
value of existing corporate debt,9 as was observed in
other countries.10
The low-inflation environment was largely sustain-
able also because of a balanced budget policy11 (see
Figure 2) which avoided demand pressures.Fiscal pol-
icy had a positive effect on the overall state of the
economy in the period 1990–97.Note that for the pur-
poses of this paper we consider the exchange rate of
CZK to be approximately 30 CZK=1 EUR
The establishment and later division of the federal
Konsolidac ˇní banka (1991–93)
The Czech AMC – Konsolidacni banka (Consolidation
Bank,further “KOB”) was established on 25February
1991 by the Czechoslovak Federal Ministry of Fi-
nance.It was set up primarily to deal with the conse-
quences of central planning,specifically loans for so-
called “perpetually revolving inventories”(known as
TOZ loans) and the “old” loans of Komerc ˇní banka
and Investic ˇní banka.On the Czechoslovak financial
market, following the January 1991 price liberalisa-
tion, TOZ loans were treated as standard short and
medium-term commercial loans with high market in-
terest rates (20–24 percent p.a.). This placed an ex-
cessive burden on businesses during the transforma-
tion period and increased banks’ credit risk.
Under a government decision
KOB therefore purchased TOZ
loans from Komerc ˇní banka and
Investic ˇní banka at clients’ request
as part of an effort to restructure
these banks and clear their debts.
These loans totalled around CZK
110.8 billion (Czech share totalled
CZK 83 billion) and the number of
clients concerned was almost 6000.
At the time KOB was established,a
gradual outflow of good clients to
other banks offering better condi-
tions was expected.12 This outflow
was also supposed to provide the
clean-up of the KOB’s balance
sheet. It was not considered appro-
priate in 1991 to expand KOB’s activities in the field of
support for uncreditworthy clients,so its purview was re-
stricted to assisting in the clean-up of commercial banks’
balance sheets,13 which were owned by the state.
Development of the bank and expansion of its
purview (1994–2001)
In 1993 Czechoslovakia split up into two sovereign
states – the Czech and the Slovak Republics. KOB
was also divided into two parts (the Czech part –
Konsolidac ˇní banka Praha,further “KOBP”).KOBP
expanded into other areas (restructuring, develop-
ment programmes). To this end its banking licence
was widened to include other activities and it began
to engage in operations to restructure specific busi-
nesses.14 The stated aim of these operations was to
make the companies as cost-effective as possible, to
identify their core areas of production and then to
find strategic partners for them.
Banks amassed non-performing loans as a result of
the 1997 financial crisis.The money market recorded
high volatility (for example, the overnight PRIBOR
neared the 200 percent level; from the medium-term
perspective, increased instability and rate volatility



















































































9 … but thus also of savings.
10 See R ˇ ez ˇábek (2007).
11 See Klaus (1992) and Holman (2001).
12 The TOZ conditions at KOB were fixed at 12–13 percent p.a. re-
payable over eight years while the rates of commercial banks were
decreasing.
13See,for example,the document prepared for the Financial Council
Rekapitalizace Konsolidac ˇní banky [Recapitalisation of
Consolidation Bank],April 1992.
14Examples of restructured companies:Tatra,Zetor,Vítkovice,S ˇko-
da Holding, Spolana, C ˇKD Dopravní systémy.KOBP played a major role in preparing the privati-
sations of Czech banks and took on large quantities
of bad debts and ownership interest and securities in
largest and strategic Czech companies (Czech Air-
lines, S ˇkoda Auto, S ˇkodaHolding, etc.).
On the basis of a government decision, KOBP fund-
ed and supported huge development projects for ma-
jor Czech corporations as well as long-term projects
in the public interest in the fields of transport, com-
munication and water infrastructure and environ-
mental protection.Initially it focused on the network
of international highways and motorways connected
to the European transport network. After the 1997
floods, further programmes were established to re-
build and develop the flood-damaged transport and
water management infrastructure.KOBP acted as fi-
nancial manager and received credit from the
European Investment Bank and the state budget for
its development programmes. In 2000, the govern-
ment decided to sell KOBP’s development pro-
gramme activities to C ˇeskomoravská záruc ˇní a roz-
vojová banka (the Czech-Moravian Guarantee and
Development Bank).
Conversion of Konsolidac ˇní banka Praha into the
Czech Consolidation Agency
On 1 September 2001, on the expiration of the time
limit laid down in the Act on Banks,KOPB ceased to
exist and its successor – a non-bank institution called
the Czech Consolidation Agency (CCA) – came into
being. The CCA was established as an incorporated
legal entity under Act No. 239/2001 Coll.15 The ter-
mination of CCA was set for 31 December 2007. It
managed state assets, and the
state guaranteed its liabilities.The
CCA was not a bank under a spe-
cial statute, so it was not allowed
to accept deposits from the public
or to provide loans. However, it
was obliged to complete all the ac-
tivities and transactions it had
taken over from KOPB, to which
end it was allowed to use all the
rights, methods and instruments
that had been available to the
bank. The assets managed by the
CCA were subject to inspection
by the Supreme Audit Office.
The CCA’s statutory body was a
five-member board of directors appointed by the gov-
ernment at the proposal of the minister of finance.
Under a government decision,the board of directors
was also required to undertake commercial opera-
tions that,owing to the risks flowing from them,could
not have been undertaken on prudential grounds.
Significant powers were vested in a nine-member su-
pervisory board elected by the lower house of the
Czech parliament. The supervisory board approved
among other things individual financial and asset
transactions exceeding CZK 500 million and deci-
sions outside the framework of the annual financial
plan and budget.
Stabilisation, segmentation and new CCA
close-down strategy
Aware of its new status as a non-bank institution with
time-limited existence and of the need to wind up its
activities quickly,the CCA stabilised its activities and
segmented its portfolio.The segmentation of the port-
folio was a crucial strategic decision of the ministry
of finance and the board of the CCA as the portfolio
was divided into segments where a different workout
strategy could be implemented.These segments also
included a very important segment of strategic com-
panies where a governmental decision and a more
careful approach was needed.
In early 2002,a rapid exit strategy for the assets in the
CCA’s portfolio was drawn up by its board of direc-
tors and approved by its supervisory board and by the
minister of finance.The main instrument of this strat-











































































15 A law passed on 21 June 2001 – there was very little time to im-
plement it.CESifo DICE Report 3/2009 25
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egy was the sale of assets in blocks of tens of billions
of koruna (see Figure 4). In 2002, a block sale of as-
sets totalling CZK 37.8 billion was prepared and suc-
cessfully executed.The return on the assets sold was
14.6 percent of their book value and 9 percent of their
total value.16 A specific block sale of bankruptcy
claims was then conducted in 2003.17 A plan for fur-
ther block sales was prepared.This plan,based on the
experience gained from the preceding block sales,re-
sponded to recommendations made by the European
Commission and other international institutions for
rapidly and transparently reducing CCA’s balance
sheet total.The plan set out a sequence of subsequent
block sales to be held in 2003 and
2004.The objective was to signifi-
cantly reduce CCA’s balance sheet
total to a minority level in the next
few block sales,18 with a view to
closing down the CCA some time
in 2005–07 depending on the ex-
tent and time schedule of asset
transfers from commercial bank
C ˇSOB.
Another effective asset sale in-
strument used by the CCA were
individual sales of claims (the re-
turn on these individual sales in
2002 was 28.5 percent of the book
value of the claims, or 37 percent
excluding transactions that the
CCA was obliged to perform un-
der government resolutions).
In 2002 the CCA actively managed
its clients in order to optimise the
recovery rate. In addition to block
sales and individual sales (includ-
ing restructuring and sale of select-
ed businesses to strategic partners
in compliance with government
resolutions),the CCA made use of
the following workout methods:
sale of ownership interests and se-
curities, legal methods19 (sale of
collateral, liquidation, bankruptcy,
execution, legal action) and resc-
tructiring of the payments scheme
and their actual payments.This ac-
tive portfolio management enabled the CCA to collect
large amounts of claims (see Figure 5).
Balance sheet totals
The balance sheet of KOB (later Konsolidac ˇní banka
Praha, KOPB) was initially stable,20 fluctuating
around CSK/CZK 100 billion. However, amid finan-
cial crises in the late 1990s, the balance sheet of
KOPB (later the Czech Consolidation Agency,CCA)
skyrocketed in 1999 because of new non-performing
loans and assets transferred onto its balance sheet as
16 For comparison, a pilot block sale held in 2001 contained assets
totalling CZK 19.1 billion with a return of 11.4 percent of the book
value and 7.1 percent of the total value.
17 The sale involved claims on 2,773 debtors with a book value of
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WORKOUT METHODS FOR THE CCA'S PROBLEM ASSETS
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18 By the end of 2003 the CCA had conducted 12 block sales.
19 In view of the fact that legal environment was at this time not ef-
fective and legal proceedings were lengthy,the use of legal methods
was limited.
20 Thanks to minimal transfers of other assets.a result of the macroeconomic 
situation (extremely high and vol-
atile interest rates21 – see Figure 6),
regulatory measures (e.g., supervi-
sory actions undertaken by the
CNB in 1999 in the area of non-ac-
ceptance of real estate collateral on
risky loans), the manner of privati-
sation of some banks, and other
government measures (e.g.,a clean-
up of the health insurance sector).
The CCA’s balance sheet total
peaked in mid-2002 at a record
CZK 271 billion as a result of mas-
sive transfers of assets to the CCA
(see Figures 7 and 8).Thanks,how-
ever,to the start of the CCA wind-
ing-up process and to the CCA’s
active portfolio management po-
licy (for example, a record CZK 
58 billion was collected that year),
the balance sheet total remained
at the 2001 level in 2002 and fell in
each subsequent year.
Losses of consolidation 
institutions
The consolidation institutions
(CIs) posted a total cumulative
loss of CZK 236 billion over their
lifetime.The losses were due main-
ly to transfers from banks and oth-
er transfers of non-performing as-
sets from other state institutions.
The CIs purchased these transfers
at prices far exceeding their mar-
ket value on the basis of political
decisions. According to bank reg-
ulations provisions and reserves
were set aside for the transferred
assets. These formed the CI’s loss
for the fiscal year. Perhaps the
most visible are the 2001–02 loss-
es, when assets were transferred
from C ˇSOB to the CCA.22The to-





























































































21 On 16 May 1997 the CNB’s Lombard
rate was increased to 50 percent p.a., and
on 4 June 1997 the basic 2-week repo rate
was raised to 39 percent p.a. (for more de-
tails see Figure 6).
22 Assets were also transferred from
















































































BALANCE SHEET TOTALS OF KOB/KOPB/CCA
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Source: CCA and author's calculations.
TRANSFERS, BALANCE SHEET TOTALS AND ASSETS WORKED
 OUT
 IN  KOB/KOPB/CCA
CSK/CZK billion
a) No data available from 2004–06
a)
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tal loss from transfers from C ˇSOB alone was around
CZK 120 billion (see Figure 9).
Another major loss-making factor was refinancing
costs, which totalled CZK 117 billion in 1991–2003,
because the CIs had to raise funds on the money mar-
ket themselves in order to execute transactions or-
dered by the government. These funds were not di-
rectly financed by the state but had a governmental
guarantee.
Due to different transfer prices and accounting
methodology differences23 it is impossible to simply
compare the cumulative loss and the amounts of
transferred assets to the CIs.For the purposes of this
paper and lessons learned in the ongoing global fi-
nancial crisis, we calculated a benchmark for the re-
covery rates of market based work-out methods:
• actual payments up to 100 percent (but due to loan
restructuring over a much longer time span),
• individual sales 30 percent,
• block sales excluding assets related to bankrupt-
cies 15 percent,
• mixed block sales 10 percent,
• block sales of consisting mainly of bankruptcies 
3 percent.
The estimated total recovery rate in 2001 was 15 per-
cent and 16 percent in 2002 in the Czech Republic.In
comparison, the Slovak recovery rates were during
the same period were around 6 percent. The reader
should bear in mind that these re-
covery rates are very specific as
they relate to non-performing as-
sets originating in the process of
an economic transition accompa-
nied by a weaker legislation and
different standards for granting
the credits by banks.
Conclusion:Assessment of the
work of the Czech consolidation
institutions
KOB was established as a means of
supporting the transition to a mar-
ket economy.After 1997,however,
KOBP started to be misused as a
solution to the economy’s woes. In particular, it was
used to saturate the state budget, as KOBP/CCA
bought up and saturated government-ordered, loss-
making transactions which were not settled from the
state budget until several years later. From a histori-
cal perspective, thanks to the good strategy and firm
foundations laid in the early 1990s, the Czech
Republic succeeded in creating a stable macroeco-
nomic environment with stable interest rates (apart
from some excesses in 1997) in comparison with oth-
er transition countries.The consolidation institutions
– Konsolidac ˇní banka,Konsolidac ˇní banka Praha and
the Czech Consolidation Agency – were instrumen-
tal in that success.
There remains the academic question of what would
have happened in the second half of the 1990s had
the aforementioned shocks not occurred in the fi-
nancial market and had some banks not been hur-
riedly privatised, tripling transfers to the CCA and
causing significant material and moral losses. More
than CZK 400 billion was transferred to the CIs in
the bank privatisation process (and over CZK 500 bil-
lion was transferred overall). Almost half of this to-
tal24 consisted of assets transferred from C ˇSOB.
Without the transfers from C ˇSOB the loss would have
been 50 percent lower and the CCA would have been
shut down several years earlier.
Despite the above-mentioned theoretical drawbacks
of asset management companies, the situation in the
transforming post-communist Czech economy war-




















































































PROFIT / LOSS OF KOB/KOPB/CCA
CZK million
Figure 9
23 Different transfer prices (market, book, total, value, etc.), refi-
nancing costs, etc.
24 Around CZK 190 billion.ranted the establishment of an asset management
company in Czech Republic and the transfer of bad
loans from the banks’ balance sheets into this insti-
tution. First of all, the Czech legal environment was
very weak at the beginning of the transformation
process.Second,all banks were state-owned at the be-
ginning of the transformation. Third, the secondary
market for non-performing loans was virtually non-
existent. Fourth, the three biggest state banks repre-
sented a systematically important majority of the
Czech banking industry.And finally,foreign investors
were unwilling to invest in large Czech state banks
before their balance sheets were cleaned up and their
capital base strengthened or without additional guar-
antees.Out of many possible theoretical possibilities,
the Czech government could have either liquidated
most of the banks and caused a major banking crisis,
strengthened the capital base of banks without trans-
ferring bad loans from their balance sheets,or set up
an AMC and gone through a long and painful process
of bad debt restructuring. The Czech government
chose the latter option.
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